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CATEGORIES, TIERS OF REVIEW, AND THE ROILING SEA OF 
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE AND PRINCIPLE: A 
METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES V. 
ALVAREZ 
Rodney A. Smolla* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Alvarez,1 the Supreme Court struck down the 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005,2 in a splintered decision with no five-
Justice majority.3  The failure of five Justices to agree on a single 
rationale, rather than the merits of the case itself, is the principal 
focus of this article. 
The modest hypothesis of this article is that the Supreme Court 
has lacked doctrinal discipline in adhering to any consistent and 
clear set of doctrinal principles when analyzing content-based 
regulation of speech.  This lack of disciplined consistency, highly 
visible in Alvarez, diminishes stability and predictability in First 
Amendment analysis.  Such instability poorly serves legislative 
bodies, by diminishing the quality of constructive guidance as to 
what forms of speech regulation are or are not constitutional.  The 
instability also handicaps lower courts tasked with judicial review 
of speech regulation. 
Setting the formulaic world of legal doctrine aside, Alvarez offers 
a good rough and ready guide to three very different judicial 
sensibilities regarding the preferred position of freedom of speech in 
the constitutional hierarchy.  Visible in the spread of the three 
opinions in Alvarez are (1) the view, represented by Justice 
Kennedy‘s plurality opinion, that freedom of speech occupies an 
exalted position, rarely trumped by other societal values,4 (2) the 
view, represented by Justice Breyer‘s concurrence, that freedom of 
 
* President, Furman University. 
1 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
2 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
3 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
4 Id. at 2542–51. 
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speech deserves some elevated stature in the constitutional scheme, 
but not a stature so elevated that it cannot be overtaken by well-
crafted laws vindicating other significant society values,5 and (3) the 
view, represented by Justice Alito‘s dissent, that speech may be 
divided into that speech which serves some plausible positive 
purpose, which is deserving of constitutional protection, and that 
speech which advances no legitimate end worth crediting, yet is 
highly offensive to good order and morality, which is not deserving 
of any protection.6 
II.  THE GHOST OF CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
First Amendment analysis has long been plagued by the ghost of 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,7 in which the Supreme Court 
suggested that the best way to handle judicial review of laws 
regulating speech was simply to list certain classes of speech as 
outside of the First Amendment‘s coverage.8  In one of the most 
famous passages in the history of free speech jurisprudence, the 
Court in Chaplinsky confidently declared: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or ―fighting‖ words—those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.9 
This passage has haunted free speech law for sixty years.  The 
struggle of the Justices in Alvarez to unify behind any one coherent 
test for measuring the validity or invalidity of the Stolen Valor Act 
is the most recent example.10 
Purely as a description of contemporary First Amendment case 
outcomes, the Chaplinsky standard is all but worthless.  Chaplinsky 
is both an overstatement and an understatement of the state of 
play. 
Chaplinsky is an overstatement in that many of the classes of 
 
5 Id. at 2551–56 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
7 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
8 Id. at 571–72. 
9 Id. 
10 See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
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speech listed by the Court as not ―rais[ing] any Constitutional 
problem‖ have come to be understood as raising big constitutional 
problems.11  Indeed, elaborate bodies of law have evolved to resolve 
those problems, providing substantial constitutional protection for 
speech that is lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and insulting.12 
Take—as an especially graphic example—the legal fate of the ―F 
Word,‖ the mother of all words commonly labeled lewd or profane, 
in the years since Chaplinsky.  In Cohen v. California,13 the Court 
held the phrase ―Fuck the Draft,‖ worn on a jacket in a public place, 
was protected by the First Amendment.14  And most recently, in 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,15 the Court overturned an 
attempt by the Federal Communications Commission to penalize 
broadcasters for broadcasting the ―F Word‖ as an impermissible 
―fleeting expletive[].‖16  In the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, 
broadcast by Fox, ―the singer Cher exclaimed during an unscripted 
acceptance speech: ‗I‘ve also had my critics for the last 40 years 
saying that I was on my way out every year.  Right.  So f[uck] 
‗em.‘‖17  In the Billboard Music Awards in 2003, Nicole Richie 
adlibbed while presenting an award: ―Have you ever tried to get cow 
s[hit] out of a Prada purse?  It‘s not so f[uck]ing simple.‖18 
Congress long ago banned the broadcast of ―any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language.‖19  The Supreme Court sustained the 
power of the FCC to enforce this provision in its famous decision in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,20 in which the Court sustained the 
Commission‘s determination that George Carlin‘s ―Filthy Words‖ 
monologue was indecent.21  The Pacifica case, however, left open the 
question of whether fleeting episodes of indecency or vulgarity could 
be punished, consistent with the First Amendment.22  As the Fox 
litigation reached the Supreme Court, it was thought that the Court 
 
11 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (footnote omitted). 
12 See Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The 
Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. 
L. REV. 317, 323–60 (2009) (discussing free speech regulation in the years after the 
Chaplinsky decision). 
13 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
14 See id. at 16, 26. 
15 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012). 
16 Id. at 2311, 2320. 
17 Id. at 2314 (citation omitted). 
18 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
20 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
21 Id. at 729, 741. 
22 See id. at 750. 
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might retreat from Pacifica, and hold that changes in technology 
and culture, and perhaps even the evolution of First Amendment 
doctrine, had formed enough of a perfect storm to undermine 
Pacifica.23  The Court in Fox ducked these large issues, leaving 
them for another day, instead deciding on narrow grounds that the 
actions of the FCC were unconstitutional because they failed 
provide fair notice of the conduct prohibited.24 
The fate of the ―F Word,‖ now constitutionally protected in many 
circumstances notwithstanding Chaplinsky, is one of many 
examples of Chaplinsky as an overstatement of current outcomes in 
free speech cases.  The rich seam of First Amendment law 
emanating from New York Times Company v. Sullivan,25 
articulating the complex constitutional standards that now apply to 
the law of defamation, is yet another highly visible refutation of the 
Chaplinsky formulation as an accurate doctrinal descriptor.26 
If Chaplinsky is an overstatement of categories of speech that the 
First Amendment does not protect, it is also an understatement, 
failing to account for the many cases of the last sixty years in which 
speech that is not within any of the delineated Chaplinsky 
categories has nonetheless been held outside the protection of the 
First Amendment in certain circumstances.27  Any number of 
examples might be picked, but an especially telling line of cases 
involve student speech, in which the Supreme Court has sustained 
regulation of speech by students in three major cases in which the 
speech itself was pallid in its offensiveness, yet still outside the 
protection of the Constitution when expressed in connection with 
school activities.28  The Court thus upheld the discipline of a 
student for a sexually suggestive, but not at all explicit, speech 
given while running for student office,29 it upheld regulation of a 
student journalist for a student newspaper exposé on teenage 
 
23 See Tony Mauro, High Court to Revisit „Indecent‟ Language Issue, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 
2008, at 2. 
24 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012). 
25 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964) (facing an appeal from a challenge 
for libel for an advertisement in a newspaper that made false statements). 
26 See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–49 (1974) (creating a 
complex matrix of fault and damages rules based on whether a plaintiff is a public or a 
private figure). 
27 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court‟s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 61–62 (2000). 
28 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007). 
29 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 685. 
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pregnancy,30 and most famously of all, it sustained disciplinary 
action against a student for unfurling a banner proclaiming ―BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.‖31 
I believe coherent First Amendment doctrines can be brought to 
bear to inform principled analysis of all the myriad conflicts that 
arise in the ongoing evolution of free speech law in America.  The 
categorical approach of Chaplinsky, however, will not cut it.  This 
doesn‘t mean that under alternative approaches there won‘t often be 
extremely close and difficult cases, or that predicting how the 
Supreme Court will eventually rule in those close and difficult cases 
will ever be an exact science.  It does mean, however, that the rules 
of the game can be more precisely defined, and the principles that 
animate those rules more thoughtfully explained.  In providing 
guidance to policymakers and reviewing courts, this would be an 
improvement. 
III.  ALVAREZ AND THE STOLEN VALOR ACT 
Alvarez is the latest example of why the categorical approach of 
Chaplinsky works so poorly.  Alvarez is, in my view, a very close and 
difficult case.  Under any plausible doctrinal standard, the outcome 
would be difficult to predict, because each side had strong 
arguments, with logical and policy heft, and solid precedential 
support.32  In both resolving the actual case before the Court in 
Alvarez and in attempting to puzzle out what Alvarez means for 
future cases involving false statements about military honors, the 
invocation of a Chaplinsky-style categorical approach did more 
harm than good. 
The plurality opinion in Alvarez striking down the Stolen Valor 
Act was written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor.33  Justice 
Breyer‘s opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice 
Kagan, provided the additional two votes against the Act.34  Justice 
 
30 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263–64, 276.  The exposé also discussed the impact of divorce on 
students.  Id. at 263. 
31 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397, 409–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 See Josh M. Parker, Comment, The Stolen Valor Act as Constitutional: Bringing 
Coherence to First Amendment Analysis of False-Speech Restrictions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 
1528–30 (2011). 
33 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542–51 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality 
opinion). 
34 Id. at 2551–56 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented.35 
The protagonist in the case, Xavier Alvarez, was described by 
Justice Kennedy as a compulsive liar.36  Alvarez had falsely claimed 
to have played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings, to have married a 
starlet from Mexico, to have been awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, and to have been wounded in combat.37  These false 
―statements were but a pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded 
him.‖38  For these pathetic attempts, Alvarez was convicted of 
violating the Stolen Valor Act, which among other things, 
criminalized a false declaration that one has received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.39 
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion made liberal use of the 
vocabulary of ―historic categories‖40 in analyzing the validity of the 
Act, stating ―content-based restrictions on speech have been 
permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few 
‗historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to 
the bar.‘‖41  The plurality opinion listed as examples: incitement, 
obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, child 
pornography, fighting words, fraud, true threats, and speech 
presenting grave and imminent danger.42  (This list of categories, it 
 
35 Id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 2542 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
37 Id.  As recounted by the Court:  
 In 2007, respondent attended his first public meeting as a board member of the Three 
Valley Water District Board.  The board is a governmental entity with headquarters in 
Claremont, California.  He introduced himself as follows: ―I‘m a retired marine of 25 years.  
I retired in the year 2001.  Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.  
I got wounded many times by the same guy.‖ 
Id. 
38 Id. 
39 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).  Section 704 of the Act provided in pertinent part:  
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS.––Whoever 
falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any 
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States . . 
. shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.  (c) 
ENHANCED PENALTY FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR.––(1) 
IN GENERAL.––If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) 
is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment provided in that subsection, 
the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. 
Id. 
40 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2539 (syllabus). 
41 Id. at 2544 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010)) (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per 
curiam) (―Among these categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent 
lawless action.‖); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (obscenity); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (providing protection for speech regarding public figures in 
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is parenthetically worth noting here, is an expansion of the list in 
Chaplinsky).  ―These categories have a historical foundation in the 
Court‘s free speech tradition,‖43 the plurality reasoned, arguing that 
―[t]he vast realm of free speech and thought always protected in our 
tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to 
those categories and rules.‖44  The plurality held that the list of 
categories of speech that may be regulated does not include any 
general exclusion of protection for false statements.45  The plurality 
dismissed various quotations from prior Supreme Court opinions 
seeming to indicate that false statements do not deserve 
constitutional protection, arguing that when considered in context, 
they were not properly understood as creating a wholesale First 
Amendment exemption for false statements of fact.46  Such prior 
references, the plurality reasoned, ―all derive[d] from cases 
discussing defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm 
associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy or 
the costs of vexatious litigation.‖47  The element of falsity may have 
 
defamation suits); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325, 347, 352 (1974) (imposing 
limits on liability for defamation of a private figure); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 
336 U.S. 490, 495 (1949) (discussing freedom of speech in relation to criminal conduct); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (fighting words); New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749, 765–66 (1982) (child pornography); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (fraud); Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (true threats); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 
697, 716 (1931) (speech presenting grave and imminent danger)).  ―A restriction under the 
last category is most difficult to sustain.‖  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)). 
43 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (―Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of 
speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements.  This comports 
with the common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an 
open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First 
Amendment seeks to guarantee.‖). 
46 Id. at 2545 (―That conclusion would take the quoted language far from its proper 
context.  For instance, the Court has stated ‗[f]alse statements of fact are particularly 
valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of 
ideas[]‘ . . . and that false statements ‗are not protected by the First Amendment in the same 
manner as truthful statements.‘‖ (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 
(1988); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982))) (―Untruthful speech, commercial or 
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.‖ (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 
at 771)); (―Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials.‖ (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979))); (―[T]here is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.‖ (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340)); (―[T]he 
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, 
do not enjoy constitutional protection.‖ (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 
(1964))) (alterations in original). 
47 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545. 
499 SMOLLA 2/28/2013  3:54 PM 
506 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.1 
 
been germane to the analysis in those cases, the plurality argued, 
but it was not determinative.48  As the plurality saw it, ―[t]he Court 
ha[d] never endorsed [a broad principle] . . . that false statements 
receive no First Amendment protection,‖ and no prior decision had 
confronted a law that targeted ―falsity and nothing more.‖49 
At the same time, the plurality did not insist that the list of 
categories of unprotected speech was a finite and complete set, 
closed to new entries; the plurality thus observed that: 
 Although the First Amendment stands against any 
―freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment,‖ . . . the Court has 
acknowledged that perhaps there exist ―some categories of 
speech that have been historically unprotected . . . but have 
not yet been specifically identified or discussed . . . in our 
case law.‖50 
But prior to ―exempting a category of speech from the normal 
prohibition on content-based restrictions,‖51 the plurality 
maintained, ―the Court must be presented with ‗persuasive evidence 
that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore 
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.‘‖52 
Invoking the imagery of George Orwell‘s classic novel Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, the plurality declared that ―[o]ur constitutional 
tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania‘s Ministry of 
Truth.‖53  Employing what amounted to a ―falsity plus‖ test,54 the 
plurality emphasized the critical difference between penalizing 
falsehood merely because it is falsehood, and penalizing falsehood 
when it is uttered to obtain some material advantage: 
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse 
alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any 
evidence that the speech was used to gain a material 
advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power 
unprecedented in this Court‘s cases or in our constitutional 
tradition.  The mere potential for the exercise of that power 




50 Id. at 2547 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010)). 
51 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547. 
52 Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011)). 
53 Id. (citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (centennial ed., 2003) (1949)). 
54 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547. 
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free speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a 
foundation of our freedom.55 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, joined the judgment of 
the Court, but rejected the plurality‘s ―strict categorical analysis.‖56  
Justice Breyer‘s opinion applied ―intermediate scrutiny‖ review but 
did not persuasively explain why intermediate scrutiny review was 
appropriate, other than to maintain that when reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute under the First Amendment, the Court 
―often found‖ it useful to apply what was sometimes called 
―intermediate scrutiny,‖ ―proportionality review,‖ or ―examination of 
‗fit.‘‖57  The cases cited by Justice Breyer were, to be sure, all 
examples of ―intermediate scrutiny.‖58  But contrary to Justice 
Breyer‘s statement, which seemed to suggest that they merited this 
level of scrutiny because they involved review of statutes, they in 
fact are all cases commonly understood as meriting intermediate 
scrutiny because they fall within areas of specialized legal doctrine 
in which intermediate scrutiny has evolved as the doctrine of 
choice.59  Perhaps the one exception is Bartnicki v. Vopper,60 
involving trafficking in illegally intercepted phone conversations, in 
which the level of review employed by the concurring opinion 
(written by Justice Breyer) was ambiguous, and in which it was 
difficult to characterize the regulation at issue as content-based or 
 
55 Id. at 2547–48. 
56 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57 Id. at 2551–52 (―In determining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, this 
Court has often found it appropriate to examine the fit between statutory ends and means.  In 
doing so, it has examined speech-related harms, justifications, and potential alternatives.  In 
particular, it has taken account of the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision 
will likely cause, the nature and importance of the provision‘s countervailing objectives, the 
extent to which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are 
other, less restrictive ways of doing so.  Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether 
the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.  
Sometimes the Court has referred to this approach as ‗intermediate scrutiny,‘ sometimes as 
‗proportionality‘ review, sometimes as an examination of ‗fit,‘ and sometimes it has avoided 
the application of any label at all.‖ (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–
52 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
plurality opinion) (proportionality); Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 480 (1989) (discussing a ―fit‖ between means and ends that is proportionate to the 
interest)).  ―[I]nterference with speech must be in proportion to the [substantial 
governmental] interest served.‖  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (alterations in original) (quoting 
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pickering v. 
Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
58 Id. at 2552. 
59 See, e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 249; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641–52; Fox, 
492 U.S. at 480; In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
60 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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content-neutral.61  In the end, without much real analysis or 
explication, Justice Breyer in Alvarez simply announced, ―in this 
case, the Court‘s term ‗intermediate scrutiny‘ describes what I think 
we should do.‖62  Applying this level of review, Justice Breyer gave 
example of the social utility of some false statements: 
False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, 
for example: in social contexts, where they may prevent 
embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from 
prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child‘s 
innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or 
otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in 
technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as 
Socrates‘ methods suggest) examination of a false statement 
(even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of 
thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.63 
Justice Breyer cited laws that prohibit trademark infringement 
as the closest analogy to the Stolen Valor Act.64  Just as trademark 
infringement may cause harm by inducing confusion among 
potential customers as to the source of goods, thereby ―diluting the 
value of the mark to its owner, to consumers, and to the economy,‖65 
he argued, ―a false claim of possession of a medal or other honor 
creates confusion about who is entitled to wear it, thus diluting its 
value to those who have earned it, to their families, and to their 
country.‖66  Trademark laws, however, are focused on actual 
commercial harm.67  Much like the plurality, Justice Breyer 
ultimately settled on the principle that few, if any statutes simply 
prohibit the telling of a lie.68 
And again, much like the plurality, Justice Breyer‘s opinion then 
went on to posit alternative avenues that would largely vindicate 
the government‘s proffered interests, concluding that ―[t]he 
Government has provided no convincing explanation as to why a 
more finely tailored statute would not work.‖69  He held out the 
possibility, however, that a more narrowly tailored statute ―could 
 
61 Id. at 535–41 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
62 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552. 
63 Id. at 2553 (citations omitted). 
64 Id. at 2554. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. at 2555. 
69 Id. at 2556. 
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significantly reduce the threat of First Amendment harm while 
permitting the statute to achieve its important protective 
objective.‖70 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a 
spirited dissent, holding out the valor of those who are awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor: 
 Only the bravest of the brave are awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, but the Court today holds 
that every American has a constitutional right to claim to 
have received this singular award.  The Court strikes down 
the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which was enacted to stem an 
epidemic of false claims about military decorations.  These 
lies, Congress reasonably concluded, were undermining our 
country‘s system of military honors and inflicting real harm 
on actual medal recipients and their families.71 
Justice Alito concluded ―that the right to free speech does not 
protect false factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no 
legitimate interest.‖72 
IV.  CATEGORIES AND TIERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
First Amendment free speech doctrine can be mystifying because 
it has never really settled in on a consistent analytical methodology. 
If one compares free speech to equal protection analysis, and 
grades on the basis of clarity, consistence, and coherence, then 
equal protection wins.  In equal protection analysis, there are the 
familiar tiers of review, the ―strict scrutiny,‖ ―intermediate 
scrutiny,‖ and ―rational basis‖ formulas that laws students commit 
to memory in their Constitutional Law course.73 
Free speech analysis, however, cannot be so neatly summarized in 
two sentences.  At times, it seems to resemble equal protection 
analysis, with the Supreme Court applying strict scrutiny to most 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 2557. 
73 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988)  (―Unless a 
statute provokes ‗strict judicial scrutiny‘ because it interferes with a ‗fundamental right‘ or 
discriminates against a ‗suspect class,‘ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so 
long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.‖ (citing Lyng v. Int‘l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 216–17 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973))). 
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content-based regulation of speech,74 and intermediate scrutiny to 
content-neutral regulations.75  The neatness of that picture 
dissolves, however, when the Court approaches free speech doctrine 
through categories.  At times, the categories are characterized as 
on/off switches.  If speech falls within the ambit of a defined 
category, such as obscenity, the First Amendment is entirely turned 
off to it.76  At other times, however, the category does not operate as 
an on/off toggle, but more like a volume control knob, so that the 
speech protection within a certain category is dialed up or dialed 
down.  Commercial speech is a prime example.77 
The hierarchical place of speech within a certain category may 
evolve over time.  Commercial speech was once treated as outside of 
all First Amendment protection,78 but now is treated as within the 
protection of the First Amendment, but not at ―full volume,‖ 
receiving an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.79  As many 
as four Supreme Court Justices have suggested at various times in 
recent years that the intermediate standard for commercial speech 
should be discarded, and it should graduate to full volume First 
Amendment protection.80 
There are also times in which the approach to First Amendment 
analysis focuses not just on the content of the speech itself, but on 
nature of the harm the speech is alleged to have caused; for 
 
74 See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club‘s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 
(2011) (―Laws that burden political speech are‘ accordingly ‗subject to strict scrutiny, which 
requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.‖ (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm‘n, 
130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–52 (1994) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to content-neutral cable ―must carry‖ rules). 
76 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 36–37 (1973). 
77 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
78 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
79 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
80 Over the years, a number of Justices have suggested that they might be willing to 
abandon the Central Hudson test in favor of a commercial speech standard more closely 
aligned with the higher levels of protection now applied to non-commercial speech.  See, e.g., 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgment).  Indeed, at various times as many as four different Justices have 
expressed doubts about adhering to Central Hudson.  See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass‘n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); 44 
Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 501, 510–14 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, and 
Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 
518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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example, there are First Amendment tests for incitement,81 true 
threats,82 and fraud.83 
Finally, there are times when Justices, either openly or more 
covertly, apply ad hoc ―balancing‖ of free speech interests and 
competing societal interests, case-by-case.84 
The lack of consistency in free speech methodology is evident in 
the various opinions in Alvarez.85  Justice Breyer‘s opinion, joined 
by Justice Kagan, appeared to invoke no principled methodology at 
all, other than to announce that intermediate scrutiny was the 
proper standard.86  Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion at times 
seemed grounded entirely in the ―categorical‖ approach, yet at other 
times appeared to apply something akin to the analysis commonly 
associated with ―strict scrutiny,‖ while borrowing language 
commonly associated with ―intermediate scrutiny.‖87  And Justice 
Alito, while not openly adopting an ad hoc balancing test, in fact 
appeared to employ essentially such a test, as he has been willing to 
employ in other cases,88 a balancing methodology that was willing to 
openly disparage the weight of offensive speech, reducing it to near 
zero in the balance, and elevate the competing societal interests to 
be weighed against that speech.89 
Justice Breyer‘s opinion in Alvarez at times reads like that of a 
judicial Hamlet, torn and indecisive.90  In contrast, both the 
plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy and the dissent of Justice 
Alito, whatever their doctrinal persuasiveness, were fired in 
passionate conviction.91  As against the emotive strength of both 
 
81 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
82 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
83 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
84 Those Justices most openly willing to admit that they engaged in ad hoc balancing 
articulated those views in the 1950s.  See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 
(1959) (opinion of Justice Harlan for the majority); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
524–25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Am. Commc‘ns Ass‘n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 
(1950) (opinion of Chief Justice Vinson for the majority).  But as noted in the text, Justice 
Breyer‘s approach often appears to be a form of such pragmatic case-by-case balancing, a view 
that might also be attractive to Justice Kagan, and Chief Justice Roberts in his Stevens 
opinion accused the then-Solicitor General Kagan of adopting that position on behalf of the 
United States.  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
85 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012); see also supra Part III. 
86 See supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text.   
87 See supra notes 40–55 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
90 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551–56 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra notes 56–70 
and accompanying text. 
91 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542–51 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion), 2556–65 (Alito, J., 
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Justice Kennedy‘s opinion for the four Justices forming the plurality 
and the three-Justice dissent authored by Justice Alito, the 
somewhat ambivalent middle opinion of Justices Breyer and Kagan 
is cool, one might say even tepid, in its pallid (not to mention 
conclusory) preference for ―intermediate scrutiny.‖92  Justices 
Breyer and Kagan seem like two Justices torn between the 
magnetic appeal of two charismatic arguments, who end up 
splitting the difference by voting with the plurality, while keeping 
the doors open for a second try by Congress in which they would 
entertain the possibility that they might side with the dissenters 
and uphold a more narrowly drawn law.93  Justice Breyer took a 
very similar approach in Bartnicki v. Vopper, in which he voted with 
a plurality opinion to sustain a First Amendment challenge to the 
imposition of liability for trafficking in a purloined cell phone 
recording on the factually dubious ground that the recording 
showed evidence of an intent to engage in criminal violence, but 
held out the possibility that he would be willing to vote the other 
way and deny any First Amendment protection to those who publish 
stolen cell phone conversations in a fact pattern that did not involve 
speech suggesting an intent to do violence.94 
If the placid opinion of Justice Breyer in Alvarez may be faulted 
for its seemingly ―one-off‖ jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy‘s 
plurality opinion also had its failings of clarity.95  Strangely, the 
plurality opinion in Alvarez avoided any crisp articulation of the 
standard of review being applied.  One might have expected a 
straightforward invocation of ―strict scrutiny‖ review, requiring that 
the law be justified by a compelling government interest and 
narrowly tailored, that is, employing the ―least restrictive means‖ to 
effectuate that interest.96  Instead, the plurality used the phrase 
―exacting scrutiny,‖97 and at times borrowed language often seen in 
intermediate scrutiny cases, such as commercial speech cases, and 
 
dissenting); see also supra notes 36–55, 71–72 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra Part III. 
93 See supra notes 56–70 and accompanying text. 
94 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535–41 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 
Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for 
Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1126, 1143 (2002) (discussing Justice Breyer‘s 
cost-benefit balancing analysis). 
95 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542–51 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
96 See, e.g., Sable Commc‘ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
97 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548 (quoting Turner Broad. System, Inc v. FCC, 522 U.S. 
622, 642 (1994)). 
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at time phrases usually seen in classic strict scrutiny review.98  The 
plurality, in short, seemed to move back and forth between its 
―categorical‖ approach to the case, a methodology under which the 
government lost because the Stolen Valor Act did not fit into any 
existing categorical exception to First Amendment protection, and a 
not very clearly defined level of scrutiny, which it seemed to employ 
to determine whether a new category of unprotected speech should 
be recognized.99 
Considering again the opinion of Justices Breyer and Kagan, a 
clue perhaps emerges as to why the plurality opinion reads this 
way.  Perhaps Justice Kennedy had hopes that either Justice 
Breyer or Justice Kagan or both would join his opinion, supplying a 
clean 5-4 or 6-3 decision.100  The actual weighing of the competing 
factors at issue contained in the plurality opinion and the opinion of 
Justices Breyer and Kagan are essentially identical.101  Justices 
Breyer and Kagan do not like First Amendment ―categories‖ as a 
mode of analysis.102  In what was somewhat of a belt-and-
suspenders approach then, the plurality first explained why the 
Stolen Valor Act failed under categorical analysis,103 and then went 
over it again, applying a mélange of strict and intermediate 
scrutiny,104 perhaps hoping this successfully recruits a fifth or sixth 
vote. 
What if, from the beginning, Justice Kennedy had simply applied 
―strict scrutiny‖?  What if his opinion had invoked the position often 
articulated in prior cases that content-based restrictions on speech 
are presumptively invalid and can be justified only if the 
government sustains its burden of proof that the law is narrowly 
tailored to vindicate a compelling governmental interest?105 
 
98 Compare Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544, 2547 (discussing exceptions to First Amendment 
protection such as fraud but citing commercial speech cases), with id. at 2549 (discussing the 
compelling interests the government provided, that they be necessary).  
99 See id. at 2543–48. 
100 Id. at 2542, 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring), 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Alvarez was a 4–2–3 opinion).  
101 Compare id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (recognizing that the statute‘s 
expansive scope would unjustifiably apply to false statements made in any environment), 
with id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the statute, without any limiting 
safeguards, poses too great a risk of liability or criminal punishment). 
102 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
103 Id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
104 Id. at 2547–51. 
105 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass‘n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (―Restrictions on speech 
based on its content are ‗presumptively invalid‘ and subject to strict scrutiny.‖ (quoting 
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass‘n., 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007) (citing R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 
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Taking what the plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy actually 
reasoned, the result would have been the same, and all the 
cumbersome baggage of ―strict categories‖ avoided.  In strict 
scrutiny review, it is common for courts to acknowledge that a 
proffered governmental interest is ―compelling,‖ at least in the 
abstract, but to then attack the law as not narrowly tailored.106  
This would easily have worked in Alvarez.  In Alvarez, the plurality 
thus recognized the significance of the government‘s proffered 
interest, agreeing that ―[i]n periods of war and peace alike public 
recognition of valor and noble sacrifice by men and women in 
uniform reinforces the pride and national resolve that the military 
relies upon to fulfill its mission.‖107  While the government‘s 
interests were ―compelling‖ (note the use of a strict scrutiny term), 
however, the plurality held that the law could not survive ―exacting‖ 
scrutiny.108 
The plurality in Alvarez thus found the broad sweep of the law to 
be one of its major infirmities.109  The law applied ―to a false 
statement made at any time, in any place, to any person.‖110  If the 
government could label this speech a criminal offense, the plurality 
reasoned, such a holding ―would endorse government authority to 
compile a list of subjects about which false statements are 
punishable.‖111 
The plurality heavily emphasized that ―[t]he First Amendment 
requires that the Government‘s chosen restriction on the speech at 
 
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).  See also Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 
(2011) (―Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid 
unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified 
by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.‖) (citations 
omitted); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 115 (1991). 
106 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 118, 121.  The Court found the State of 
New York possessed ―a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated 
by those who harm them,‖ but that the State‘s ―Son of Sam‖ law, which required the proceeds 
from works describing a convicted criminal‘s crime to be placed in escrow and made available 
to the victims, was not sufficiently narrowly tailored.  Id. 
107 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548. 
108 Id. at 2548–49. 
109 See id. at 2547–48. 
110 Id. at 2547 (―Still, the sweeping, quite unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in 
conflict with the First Amendment.  Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the 
statute would apply with equal force to personal, whispered conversations within a home.  
The statute seeks to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost 
limitless times and settings.  And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was 
made for the purpose of material gain.‖ (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539–40 (1987))). 
111 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547. 
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issue be ‗actually necessary‘ to achieve its interest.‖112  Strongly 
emphasizing causality, the plurality stated that ―[t]here must be a 
direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to 
be prevented.‖113  (This language, common in commercial speech 
cases, is essentially part of what is now the commercial speech 
intermediate scrutiny test).114  Against this test, the plurality found 
an insufficient link between the government‘s interest in protecting 
the integrity of the military honors system and the Act‘s restriction 
on the false claims of liars.115  The government had produced no 
actual evidence that the public perception of military awards was 
diluted by false claims such as those made by Alvarez.116  In an 
important passage, the plurality also emphasized the importance of 
counterspeech in the balance, and the requirement that the 
government show that counterspeech will not work to vindicate its 
interests.117  Alvarez was ridiculed at the public meeting where he 
made the false claims, and later online.118  As the plurality 
proclaimed, ―[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is 
true.  This is the ordinary course in a free society.  The response to 
the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; 
to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.‖119  Echoing Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, the plurality admonished that ―[t]he theory of our 
Constitution is ‗that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.‘‖120  
In a classic restatement of First Amendment theory, the plurality 
observed: 
The First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to 
 
112 Id. at 2549 (quoting Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)). 
113 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (citing Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738). 
114 Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and 
Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2844 (2005). 
115 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550. 
116 See id. at 2549–50. 
117 Id. at 2549 (―The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech 
would not suffice to achieve its interest.  The facts of this case indicate that the dynamics of 
free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie.  Respondent lied at a public 
meeting.  Even before the FBI began investigating him for his false statements, ‗Alvarez was 
perceived as a phony.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1211 (9th Cir. 
2010))). 
118 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549. 
119 Id. at 2550 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., 
concurring) (―If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.‖)). 
120 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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speech we do not like, and for good reason.  Freedom of 
speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of the 
state but from the inalienable rights of the person.  And 
suppression of speech by the government can make exposure 
of falsity more difficult, not less so.  Society has the right and 
civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse.  
These ends are not well served when the government seeks 
to orchestrate public discussion through content-based 
mandates.121 
The plurality concluded ―that any true holders of the Medal who 
had heard of Alvarez‘s false claims would have been fully vindicated 
by the community‘s expression of outrage, showing as it did the 
Nation‘s high regard for the Medal.‖122  The same, the plurality 
argued, could be said for the interest offered by the government; the 
American people do not need a criminal prosecution to express their 
esteem for their heroes.123  ―Only a weak society needs government 
protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve 
the truth.  Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its 
vindication.‖124 
Moreover, to invoke decisions such as New York Times Company 
v. Sullivan,125 which were designed to be protective of speech, in 
order to fashion a rule that would restrict speech, would turn First 
Amendment principle on its head: 
 The Government thus seeks to use this principle for a new 
purpose.  It seeks to convert a rule that limits liability even 
in defamation cases where the law permits recovery for 
tortious wrongs into a rule that expands liability in a 
different, far greater realm of discourse and expression.  
That inverts the rationale for the exception.  The 
requirements of a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard 
for the truth as the condition for recovery in certain 
defamation cases exists [sic] to allow more speech, not less.  
A rule designed to tolerate certain speech ought not blossom 
to become a rationale for a rule restricting it.126 
The plurality rejected the attempt of the government to analogize 
 
121 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 2550–51. 
125 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
126 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
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the Stolen Valor Act to other laws in which restrictions on false 
speech are permissible, such as laws prohibiting ―false statement[s] 
made to a Government official, . . . laws punishing perjury,‖ or 
impersonating a government official.127  In each instance, the 
plurality maintained, societal interests going beyond the prevention 
of the falsehood itself were at stake.128  Most pointed, for example, 
perjured statements are not simply unprotected because they are 
false, but because they are ―at war with justice‖129 and may ―cause a 
court to render a ‗judgment not resting on truth.‘‖130  Moreover, 
―[u]nlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the 
formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or 
her statements will be the basis for official governmental action, 
action that often affects the rights and liberties of others.‖131  Sworn 
testimony, the plurality reasoned, is thus distinct from the ordinary 
lie ―simply intended to puff up oneself.‖132  Similarly, the plurality 
reasoned, laws prohibiting the impersonation of government 
officials serve to preserve ―the integrity of government[al] 
processes.‖133 
The plurality also pointed to another simple expedient that would 
have largely vindicated the government‘s interest: a simple 
government-run database that listed all Congressional Medal of 
Honor winners.134  The plurality concluded by stating that ―[t]he 
Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is 
that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we 
embrace.‖135 
All of the argument employed by the plurality in Alvarez would 
have fit very comfortably and very persuasively within the matrix of 
a straightforward application of strict scrutiny.  And indeed, the 
same might be said of Justice Alito‘s dissent.136 
If one of the strategies often employed by courts striking down 
laws under the strict scrutiny standard is to concede (at least for the 
 
127 Id. at 2545–46 (citations omitted) 
128 See id. (discussing other injuries stemming from false statements which are not 
protected). 
129 Id. at 2546 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
130 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. at 227). 
131 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 2551. 
135 Id. 
136 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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sake of appearances or argument) that the government interest held 
up to justify the law may indeed be ―compelling,‖ and then to strike 
down the law nonetheless because it lacks narrow tailoring, one of 
the classic counter-strategies employed to uphold a law examined 
under strict scrutiny is to engage in a narrowing judicial 
construction of the law, thereby supplying the narrow tailoring 
required to survive the strict scrutiny‘s second prong.137  Justice 
Alito‘s opinion in Alvarez offered several such narrowing 
arguments.138  First, he argued, ―the Act applies to only a narrow 
category of false representations about objective facts that can 
almost always be proved or disproved with near certainty.‖139  Next, 
―the Act concerns facts that are squarely within the speaker‘s 
personal knowledge.‖140  Third, as both the plurality and 
concurrence appeared to concede, the law ―require[d] proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the speaker actually knew that the 
representation was false.‖141  Fourth, the law can be appropriately 
construed as applicable only to actual factual assertions, and not to 
expressions such as ―dramatic performances, satire, parody, 
hyperbole, or the like.‖142  Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, 
Justice Alito argued that the law was ―strictly viewpoint neutral.‖143  
The law, he reasoned, applied to all false statements, without 
regard to any connection to a particular ―political or ideological 
message.‖144 
Under an application of strict scrutiny analysis, in sum, both 
sides could marshal reasonably strong arguments—which is why 
Alvarez was a close case, and why lower courts were divided as they 
struggled over the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act.145  Had 
all the Justices joined issue under this one standard, however, the 
stability and predictability of free speech conflict resolution would 
have been enhanced, as the stability and predictability of the law is 
always enhanced when the Justices do not talk past one another, 
and agree on a single test and a common vocabulary, even though 
 








145 See id. at 2542 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (detailing the procedural history of the 
case and this issue). 
499 SMOLLA 2/28/2013  3:54 PM 
2012/2013] United States v. Alvarez 519 
 
they may divide on the application of law to fact. 
V.  FINDING A FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE IN A ROILING DOCTRINAL SEA 
Is it possible to find an authentic ―free speech principle‖ amidst 
the roiling doctrinal sea?  Not if we look for only one.  There are, 
rather, competing free speech principles at large, principles that 
have existed in opposition for some time.  I mean to set formal legal 
doctrine aside here, and search instead for underlying animating 
principles.  At one pole is the view that freedom of speech occupies 
an exalted position, so exalted as to almost never be trumped by 
other societal values.  At the opposite pole is a view first elegantly 
articulated in Chaplinsky, that speech may be divided into that 
speech which serves some plausible positive purpose or redeeming 
social value, which is deserving of constitutional protection, and 
that speech which advances no legitimate end worth crediting, yet 
is highly offensive to good order and morality, which is not 
deserving of any protection.146  And then there is a middling 
compromise position, that freedom of speech deserves some serious 
elevated stature in the constitutional scheme, but not so serious or 
elevated that it cannot be overcome by well-crafted laws 
appropriately trimmed to vindicate other significant society values. 
The two most vocal proponents of the first most robust conception 
of freedom of speech on the Court at this time are Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy.147  Justice Alito is the consistently 
courageous proponent of the opposing ―order and morality‖ 
principle.148  Various other Justices lean more or less to one side or 
the other, not always consistently. 
Justice Kennedy and his colleagues Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor, embraced in Alvarez a robust 
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause.149  This principle, which 
has received eloquent articulation over the years in a variety of 
forms, at its core asserts that government may not abridge speech 
 
146 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (discussing speech that is 
not protected). 
147 In fairness on this point, perhaps Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor ought to be 
included, as they have tended to join strong free speech opinion written by the Chief Justice 
or Justice Kennedy.  See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (announcing the opinions of the 
Court). 
148 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1223 (2011) (Alito J., dissenting) (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
149 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543–47 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (discussing the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
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solely because it finds the message disagreeable.150  Under this 
principle, the mere capacity of speech to offend, disturb, or disgust 
is not enough, standing alone, to justify its abridgement.151  This 
principle largely dominates contemporary free speech law, at least 
when the speech occurs in the open marketplace of ideas, and not in 
some specially sheltered setting, such as within the confines of 
government employment or public schools.152  The three most high-
profile offensive speech cases in recent years illustrate the 
dominance of the principle, United States v. Stevens, the animal 
cruelty case, Snyder v. Phelps, the military funerals case, and 
Alvarez itself.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority in 
Stevens and Snyder,153 Justice Kennedy for the plurality in 
Alvarez,154 and in all three, Justice Alito passionately dissented.155 
In United States v. Stevens, the Court struck down a federal law 
prohibiting the distribution of images depicting violence to 
animals,156 including disgusting ―crush videos‖ in which women 
wearing stilettos engaged in the fetish of crushing helpless animals 
with their high heels.157  The case turned out to be an 8-1 crushing 
of the act of Congress.158  The law contained an exception, borrowed 
from the long-standing First Amendment standard governing 
obscenity under Miller v. California,159 that exempted any depiction 
―that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value.‖160  In an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Roberts, the Court not only struck down the federal 
law, but also severely chastised the government for the sweeping 
arguments it advanced to defend the law.161  The Court noted that it 
 
150 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (―If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.‖) (citations omitted). 
151 Id. 
152 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994) (permitting broader proscription of 
speech by government employees as opposed to open public speech) (citing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–
86 (1986) (permitting the proscription of non-obscene but offensive speech when given at a 
school assembly). 
153 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1212 (majority opinion); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 
1582 (2010). 
154 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (Kennedy J., plurality opinion). 
155 Id. at 2556; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
156 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
157 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583. 
158 Id. at 1583, 1592. 
159 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
160 18 U.S.C.A. § 48(b). 
161 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
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had historically recognized certain categories of speech not deemed 
protected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity, defamation, 
fraud, incitement, or speech integral to criminal conduct.162  The 
Court emphatically rejected the claim that depictions of animal 
cruelty should be added to the list.163  More significantly, the Court 
rejected the notion that government has the power to add to the list 
by simply concluding that the harms caused by a given category of 
speech outweigh the benefits of the speech.164  The Court described 
this claim, as a ―free-floating test for First Amendment coverage,‖165 
as being ―startling and dangerous.‖166  In a stern rebuke of the 
government‘s argument, the Court declared: 
The First Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech does not 
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.  The First 
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American 
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any attempt 
to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech 
is not worth it.  The Constitution is not a document 
―prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be 
passed at pleasure.‖167 
While the Court had in the past often described historically 
unprotected categories of speech as being ―of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
 
162 Id. at 1584 (―These ‗historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,‘ . . . are 
‗well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.‘‖ (quoting Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (fraud); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–572 (1942)) 
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam) (incitement); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 
254–55 (1952) (defamation); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) 
(speech integral to criminal conduct)); see also Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2734 (2011) (―There was no American tradition of forbidding the depiction of animal 
cruelty—though States have long had laws against committing it.‖). 
163 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
164 Id. (―The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be 
considered under a simple balancing test: ‗Whether a given category of speech enjoys First 
Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech 
against its societal costs.‘‖). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)). 
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clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality,‖168 
the Court explained this was not ―a test that may be applied as a 
general matter to permit the Government to imprison any speaker 
so long as his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long 
as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute‘s 
favor.‖169  The Court similarly rejected the assertion that speech 
that fails to demonstrate any affirmative ―serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value,‖170 in the words of Miller v. California, 
could on that basis alone be disqualified from First Amendment 
protection.171 
Justice Alito alone dissented.172  The lynchpin of his argument 
was that the crush videos that were the principal target of Congress 
were inextricably intertwined with the criminal violence against the 
animals themselves: 
 The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it 
most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct, 
even if engaged in for expressive purposes.  Crush videos 
present a highly unusual free speech issue because they are 
so closely linked with violent criminal conduct.  The videos 
record the commission of violent criminal acts, and it 
appears that these crimes are committed for the sole purpose 
of creating the videos.  In addition, as noted above, Congress 
was presented with compelling evidence that the only way of 
preventing these crimes was to target the sale of the videos.  
Under these circumstances, I cannot believe that the First 
Amendment commands Congress to step aside and allow the 
underlying crimes to continue.173 
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court dealt with the highly 
charged and notorious protests of the Westboro Baptist Church.174  
The Westboro Baptist Church was founded by Fred Phelps in 
Topeka, Kansas in 1955.175  The ―congregation believes that God 
hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of 
 
168 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. 
170 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
171 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591. 
172 Id. at 1592 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 1598–99. 
174 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
175 Id. 
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homosexuality, particularly in America‘s military.‖176  For more 
than two decades, the Church has used, as a tactic for propagating 
its message, the picketing of military funerals, in a manner often 
deeply offensive to mourning family members and friends, and for 
that matter, most Americans of good will.177  In holding that the 
First Amendment stood as a bar to the imposition of tort liability for 
such picketing, Chief Justice Roberts‘ opinion again strongly 
endorsed a robust conception of freedom of speech: 
 Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move 
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—
inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to 
that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have 
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on 
public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.  
That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort 
liability for its picketing in this case.178 
Justice Alito again wrote an impassioned dissent.  His opening 
statement framed his argument: 
 Our profound national commitment to free and open 
debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that 
occurred in this case.   
 Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure.  He is 
simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew 
Snyder, was killed in Iraq.  Mr. Snyder wanted what is 
surely the right of any parent who experiences such an 
incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace.  But respondents, 
members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of 
that elementary right.  They first issued a press release and 
thus turned Matthew‘s funeral into a tumultuous media 
event.  They then appeared at the church, approached as 
closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a 
malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a 
time of acute emotional vulnerability.  As a result, Albert 
Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury.179 
In this trilogy of cases, the two polar free speech principles are 




178 Id. at 1220.  Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, emphasizing what he 
considered the confined scope of the Court‘s ruling.  Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
179 Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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generally prevailing, and Justice Alito fighting an often lonely 
rearguard action.180 
VI.  SOME CONCLUDING NOTES ON VOTES 
For those Justices who adhere to a robust interpretation of the 
free speech principle, the on-again, off-again invocation of 
―categories‖ of unprotected speech may reflect a feeling of unease 
over the long-term resiliency of their strong version of the free 
speech principle, a worry that they need to invoke those categories 
to inoculate First Amendment doctrine against the persistent 
insurgency of the Chaplinsky-style insistency that only speech 
plausibly contributing redeeming social value to the marketplace 
and not corrosive of order and morality is deserving of First 
Amendment protection. 
When strict scrutiny alone is employed to buttress the robust free 
speech values of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kennedy, it might 
be thought, short-term victories in certain battles may not 
guarantee long-term victory in the war.  For after all, if a law can be 
persuasively cast as narrowly drawn, even the application of the 
strict scrutiny test might not be enough to ensure that a speech-
restrictive law is struck down.  When highly sympathetic claims 
undergird the supporting governmental interests—and in cases 
such as Alvarez, Stevens, or Snyder, the interests in curtailing 
speech were highly sympathetic—then strict scrutiny comes down to 
a quibble over how overly broad or sufficiently narrow the 
regulatory mechanism is. 
In Stevens and Snyder, the laws were broad,181 and thus the 
victory for the broad free speech principle.  In Alvarez, however, the 
law was narrowly targeted enough to place the outcome in doubt.182  
Justice Alito was able to lure two other solid votes to his side, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, and did not seem so far from luring 
Justices Breyer and Kagan as well.183  Justice Kagan, it should be 
 
180 See Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito‟s Lonely War Against Abhorrent, Low-Value 
Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective Notions of 
Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 115–19 (2011). 
181 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (explaining that the underlying laws were common law 
torts); see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (―We read § 48 to create 
a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.‖). 
182 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2557 (2012) (―[T]he Act applies to only a 
narrow category of false representations.‖). 
183 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with dissent‘s 
assertion that the government had a compelling interest in penalizing an individual for 
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remembered, was the very Solicitor General who defended the 
animal cruelty law in Stevens, advancing the argument that drew 
fire and ire from the Chief Justice, an argument squarely resting on 
the jurisprudential approach advanced consistently by Justice 
Alito.184 
In short, to Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Roberts, there may 
be a feeling of greater solidity to the categorical approach.  There is 
something arguably more comforting in repeatedly warning: ―These 
limited categories and no more!‖ 
The surface appeal of this tactic, however, is offset by the 
impressive attractiveness of the counter-position, advanced so 
passionately, if still unsuccessfully, by Justice Alito.  For once it is 
conceded that the First Amendment should be governed by the 
―categories game,‖ by what rules shall that game itself be governed?  
If the answer is the formulation in Chaplinsky, embracing the 
theory that we ought to disqualify from First Amendment protection 
those utterances that ―are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality,‖185 then 
why not add categories like videos of grossly disgusting and cruel 
illegal animal abuse, or brazenly self-righteous and exploitative 
intentional infliction of emotional distress targeting the grieving 
families of slain war heroes, or the ridiculous and pathetic false 
claims that one has been awarded the sacred Congressional Medal 
of Honor? 
When measured by the yardstick of Chaplinsky, when new 
categories come knocking at the door that seem every bit as 
deserving as the categories that made the original list—the lewd, 
profane, obscene, the libelous, and fighting words—why not grant 
them entry?  Recall, after all, that even the list of categories 
acknowledged by the plurality in Alvarez as already recognized as 
exceptions to the First Amendment included categories of speech 
beyond those first noted in Chaplinsky.186 
That is why, in the end, staking the future of a robust free speech 
principle on the strict scrutiny test may be the better bet.  Crucial 
to the success of that bet, however, is a certain discipline in 
articulating what proffered governmental interests may 
 
falsely claiming military honors). 
184 See supra notes 88, 148 and accompanying text. 
185 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
186 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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legitimately qualify as ―compelling.‖ 
It is here that the real traction may be gained.  When the 
governmental interest offered up is grounded in aversion to the 
content of the message and nothing more, then the interest ought 
never be credited as compelling, if the integrity of a robust free 
speech principle is to be maintained.187 
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion in Alvarez actually comes 
quite close to this position, with its ―falsehood plus‖ test.188  Even 
more vivid was the opinion by the Chief Justice in Stevens, quoted 
with approval in Alvarez, with its open hostility to the whole notion 
of ―categories‖ as a legitimate approach to First Amendment 
analysis.189 
In the end, however, on the Supreme Court, as in democratic 
elections and the actions of legislative bodies, it all comes down to 
votes.  On that score, Alvarez stands as a cautionary tale.  With the 
Court‘s voting patterns in flux, First Amendment doctrine remains 
a complicated work in progress. 
 
187 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 160–71 and accompanying text. 
